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dos Reis Velloso* 
This article begins by briefly analysing the situation 
in Brazil which followed the crisis of the 1980s, 
contrasting it with the recent modifications which 
have taken place in the pattern of industrialization 
on the world level. The article goes on to discuss the 
new trends and their consequences for the world 
economy in general and the developing countries in 
particular. 
The competitiveness an efficiency of Brazilian 
industry are the examined. For this purpose, national 
exports are classified according to their competitive-
ness, with due regard for their techological and pro-
ductive heterogeneity. 
The basic ideas of the strategy proposed are to 
renew the modernization process, achieving growth 
with redistribution and reforms; to begin a new stage 
of industrialization; to obtain a national consensus 
on a model of development; and to seek a better 
involvement in the world economy. 
The proposed strategy includes three main lines 
of action: to explore the dynamic comparative 
advantages of the country; to strengthen domestic 
and external competitiveness; and to bring the logic 
of industrialization to other sectors, such as agricul-
ture, functional services and mining. Different 
public-policy instruments are spelled out in order to 
explain the strategy. 
•President of the Brazilian Institute for Capital 
Markets (BICM) of Sao Paulo, Brazil. 
The definition of a new industrial and techno-
logical strategy for Brazil is especially significant 
at this time. There are two main reasons for this. 
The first is that the crisis of the 1980s has 
left a trail of infrastructural damage in electric 
energy, communications and transportation 
(mostly roads and ports), and of technological 
backwardness in several industrial sectors, 
including those oriented to exports. Throughout 
the decade no new industrial strategy has been 
defined to replace the strategy of 1974, which 
was worked out in reaction to the oil crisis. By 
failing to do so, Brazil has not only lost the 
chance of participating in the new cycle of world 
expansion begun in 1984, but also has fallen 
behind the recently industrialized countries of 
Asia, like the Republic of Korea and the Chinese 
province of Taiwan, which have moved on to a 
new stage of industrialization by adopting new 
technologies. 
The second reason is the authentic industrial 
revolution taking place in the world, especially 
in the second half of the decade just ended. The 
basic pattern of industrialization has been modi-
fied by the tremendous impact of high technolo-
gies. The effects of this new industrialization 
must be carefully considered, both from the posi-
tive viewpoint of new opportunities and from 
the negative viewpoint of the limits they place 
on Brazil's competitiveness. 
I 
The new world 
trends and their 
consequences 
International competition today is undergoing 
profound changes, which include the following: 
a) The pattern of industrialization is rapidly 
being modified. Up to the 1970s, it followed the 
path of metalworkíng and chemical complexes. 
The new pattern of development, as is well-
known, is highly conditioned by the new tech-
nologies: microelectronics, informatics, 
telecommunications, automation, new mate-
rials, laser, biotechnology, and renewable sour-
ces of energy. 
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The heart of these technologies is informa-
tion technology, mainly symbolic information, 
of numbers or words, and also images, but which 
can even decipher and reprogramme informa-
tion about living matter through genetic engi-
neering, which serves as the basis of 
biotechnology. Recent applications of informa-
tion technology are based on discoveries about 
new materials, on the transformation of energy 
by the laser, and where applicable, on new forms 
of renewable energy. 
In the developed countries, the new technol-
ogies have produced two main currents of reno-
vation:1 the development of more advanced 
sectors, creating a new technological and indus-
trial pattern; and the renovation of modern sec-
tors —and even some older ones— which 
recover their dynamism and. competitiveness 
(among them, for example, the textile sector of 
countries like Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom). 
b) Even though they did not invent these 
new technologies—frequently developed by the 
United States- countries with an active industrial 
policy, headed byjapan, knew how to make them 
the basis of á whole, progressively more com-, 
píex, international offensive. The dominant 
note, however, was the attempt to conquer prin-
cipally the United States and European markets, 
either through exports in areas like electronics 
or automotive vehicles, or by investing in those 
very markets in order to ensure a better penetra-
tion. Trade and investment thus became comple-
mentary instruments in that offensive, which 
displayed a great capacity to adapt to specific 
local demands by differentiating products, as 
happened in the classic case of Nissan automo-
biles in the United States, described by David 
Halberstam (1987). 
At the same time, Japan multiplied its links 
with the so-called "four tigers" (Republic of 
Korea, the Chinese province of Taiwan, Singa-, 
pore and Hong Kong), especially with the 
Republic of Korea; with China, which is becom-
ing the new global competitor in world markets; 
and, more recently, with the countries of the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). 
c) The United States and Europe became 
more protectionist in reaction to this offensive. 
The concept of managed trade and the principle 
of reciprocity overrode the traditional principles 
of non-discrimination and transparency estab-
lished by the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT). At the same time, huge com-
mon markets began to develop, characteristic of 
the multipolar world which is perhaps replacing 
United States hegemony. One need only men-
tion the free-trade agreement between the Uni-
ted States and Canada, with repercussions in 
Mexico; it could in fact lead to a special integra^ 
tion scheme with the common market of Ocea-
nia (Australia and New Zealand). Therefore, the 
United States strategy has clearly not been 
limited to defensive reactions. 
Along the same lines, the unification stra-
tegy of the European Economic Community in 
1992 is being careful to avoid having the enlarge-
• ment of its market benefit principally United 
States and Japanese transnational corporations. 
s
 It seems clear that a new dynamism is dominat-
ing Europe, reaching even the peripheral zones 
such as Portugal and Greece, and certainly with 
strong centres such as the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and per-
haps France. 
In any case, in forming these large regional 
blocs (¡n which Brazil does not participate), 
there is an element of trade diversion, and, con-
sequently of inversion, which is detrimental to 
the countries outside of these common markets 
and certainly, favourable to those within them., 
Eastern Europe, with a mediocre economic 
performance up till recently, could recover its 
strength with the help of Gorbachev's peres-
troïka. The new attitude of the Soviet leadership 
has already helped to minimize or resolve local 
conflicts in different parts of the world. Interna-
tional tensions have been relaxed, which could 
contribute to the new cycle of expansion on a 
world scale. 
d) In the light of the trend to strengthen the 
regional blocs, which favours the industrialized 
. countries through trade diversion and invest-
ment, consideration should be given to the inter-
national effects of macroeconomic imbalances. 
The main imbalance is the United States 
tendency to maintain huge trade deficits, and 
therefore new devaluations of the dollar. This 
would lead to a greater loss of competitiveness 
by the European countries and Japan in relation 
to the countries of the dollar zone, generally 
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including the newly industrialized countries. At 
the same time, European and Japanese invest-
ment in medium- and even high-tech product 
lines, and/or intensive use of capital, generally 
long-cycle products (naval construction, capital 
goods and their components, durable consumer 
goods and certain electronic products), could be 
moved to the recently industrialized countries. 
e) To the extent that competition among the 
large blocs increases, markets will become more 
international, with financial and capital markets 
operating apart from currents of trade and direct 
investment, through credit operations, in the 
first case, and portfolio decisions (and not direct 
industrial investment) in the second. 
In this much more internationalized —and 
therefore interdependent— context, national 
policies have to take into account the actions of 
large transnational corporations. These tend to 
adopt strategies designed for world-wide 
competition and serve as active agents of the 
new changes, both with respect to the industrial 
pattern and the formation of new common 
markets. 
It is difficult to single out the trends in a 
situation of conflicting and increasingly world-
wide movement. Nevertheless, although the 
different blocs compete among themselves, it 
cannot be denied that there is greater integration 
within the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) i.e., 
between the countries of the developed world. 
This can be seen in trade currents, direct 
investments, technological alliances, financial 
investments and capital markets. 
On the one hand, since 1984 the United 
States has experienced a period of sustained 
prosperity, which has attracted large external 
investments, currents of financial capital and 
portfolio investments. On the other hand, 
European unification is awakening considerable 
interest among the Japanese and United States 
transnational corporations, which are afraid of 
losing their position in exporting to this market. 
Finally, the debt crisis has cut off the flow of 
foreign capital, both risk and financial, from the 
countries of Latin America: 
This trend has not prevented the recently 
industrialized countries of Asia from continuing 
to develop dynamic industrial policies, which 
always reveal new possibilities of external com-
petitiveness. Their gross domestic product and 
especially their exports continue to increase 
rapidly, which would indicate that they are tak-
ing advantage of the new cycle of world expan-
sion. Even the external debt of the Republic of 
Korea has already ceased to be a problem, since it 
is being reduced even in absolute value. 
A new star is coming on to the stage of world 
competition: the People's Republic of China. On 
the one hand, its yearly exports, of the order of 
US$130 billion to 140 billion, and its reserves, 
close to US$90 billion, already make it one of the 
major participants. On the other hand, its open-
ing to a market economy and to advanced tech-
nologies has accelerated the process of economic 
integration with Hong Kong and the Chinese 
province of Taiwan. Whatever the outcome of 
its political integration, the Chinese world is a 
new, natural, common market. 
These facts basically mean that the increas-
ingly world-wide character of markets and the 
strengthening of large regional blocs have 
undoubtedly intensified competition and placed 
the developing countries somewhat on the 
margin. 
Nevertheless, as the recently industrialized 
countries of Asia, the People's Republic of China 
and the Soviet Union itself (and with it, the East 
European bloc) have understood, these effects 
imply important disadvantages only when 
developing economies lack specific weight and 
accept a static situation with respect to compara-
tive advantages and competitiveness; in other 
words, when they accept being on the margin, 
which is certainly not inevitable. These econo-
mies suffer damage when they do not develop, 
on their own or through transnational enter-
prises, new factors of competitiveness from the 
new pattern of industrialization; if they do not 
form new alliances, in order to avoid remaining 
outside world markets; if they do not take advan-
tage of opportunities to relocate investments or 
new export lines linked with the deactivation of 
certain sectors in Europe and Japan, owing to the 
new devaluation of the dollar; and if they do not 
find new ways to involve themselves in world 
competition. 
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II 
The competitiveness and productivity of Brazilian industry 
Having made these observations, we turn now to 
the question of the competitiveness and 
efficiency of Brazilian industry. 
The first point to explore is the 
competitiveness of Brazilian exports. It is 
mainly a question of knowing whether this 
compet i t iveness depends excessively on 
macroeconomic instruments, such as the 
exchange policy, or if it is more closely linked to 
factors of industrial productivity. A first answer 
is found in a study done by the IE1, of the Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro. The study 
concludes that Brazilian exports of manufactures 
are divided into three groups on the basis of 
factors of competitiveness: 
Group I consists of non-durable consumer 
goods, such as footwear and clothing. Their 
competitiveness is derived from the domestic 
use of abundant natural inputs (for example, 
textile fibres and leather) and relatively cheap 
labour. They combine advantages derived from 
being relatively well endowed with factors which 
have other advantages such as the domination of 
production techniques, adequate scales and 
quality control. The possibilities of modifying 
such advantages are increasing, owing to the use 
of electronic equipment. 
Group II consists mainly of intermediate 
goods (for example, steel, pulp, aluminium and 
chemical products). The main element of their 
competitiveness is the degree of technological 
advancement of their productive capacity. There 
are advantages derived from recently installed 
scales of economic production, associated with 
the low cost of abundant inputs in the country 
(iron ore, wood, bauxite). Modifications of the 
comparative advantages can be based on 
substitute materials (plastics, ceramics). In any 
case, it is indispensable to remain up to date with 
respect to absorbing the logic of informatics. 
Group HI consists especially of capital goods, 
weapons and durable consumer goods, all with 
m u l t i p l e a t t r i b u t e s and cons ide rab le 
diversification. At times they are presented in 
" p a c k a g e s " ( s y s t e m s of g o o d s and 
complementary services). Competitiveness is 
derived especially from technological training 
and attention to the specific needs of certain 
markets. Exports are encouraged by long-term 
financing, generally from abroad. Economies 
associated with increasing skills are important. 
The State usually plays an important role in 
sales. 
To a large extent, this group involves 
exports to countries less technologically deve-
loped than Brazil. In some cases, such as aircraft, 
Brazil can compete with developed countries. 
Having its own technological training and stay-
ing up to date technologically are vital for main-
taining the competitiveness of these products. 
To these three groups of manufactured 
goods should be added the agroindustrial com-
plexes in which Brazil was able to consolidate its 
activity, such as soya and orange juice, as well as 
the sectors linked with mineral processing. This 
would give a complete picture of the country 
with respect to its industrial exports, in a broad 
sense. 
It can be concluded that Brazilian competi-
tiveness is linked largely to specific sectoral fac-
tors, which can range from being relatively well 
endowed with labour and natural resources to 
the modern character of large-scale installations 
(with standardized technology and reasonable 
competition with respect to the technology of 
the product and process). This does not mean 
that the exchange policy was unimportant. The 
need to generate tremendous surpluses led to the 
constant adjustment of the real exchange rate. 
The huge devaluation of 1983 was part of an 
effort to face an emergency situation. Neverthe-
less, specific factors of competitiveness are more 
related to an evaluation of the levels of efficiency 
of Brazilian industry in comparison to external 
competition. 
Any analysis of the question is difficult at 
this time because, as is known, in recent years the 
non-tariff system of barriers only allowed pro-
ducts to be imported that did not compete with 
national products. For this reason, we preferred 
to use the World Bank study based on a survey 
taken in 1980-1981, a period in which the level 
of non-tariff restrictions was much lower. 
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The study begins by referring back to the 
situation in 1967, after protective tariffs were 
reduced by the government of President Castelo 
Branco. In that year, the level of nominal protec-
tion was48%, with the real level atan average of 
66% for the processing industry. The highest 
level (101% effective protection) was achieved 
by consumer goods. Intermediate goods were 
close to the average and capital goods below it. 
The situation reflected the industrial policy of 
the time: strong protection for consumer goods, 
which constituted import substitution, and less 
protection for equipment, the importation of 
which was subsidized. 
The analysis made of the 1980-1981 period 
gives very different results. The implicit effec-
tive protection was 23% on the average for the 
processing industry. This was measured directly 
(not by the tariff) by the difference between 
domestic and external prices according to the 
equilibrium exchange rate —"shadow"— and 
the current subsidies. (It should be noted in pass-
ing that the figure for agriculture was -21%.) 
Considering the different categories, the figure 
was 16% for consumer goods, 22% for interme-
diate products and 37% for capital goods. This 
means that the overall level of protection was 
reduced, the protection of consumer goods 
(imports of which had long since been substi-
tuted) was considerably lowered, and the protec-
tion for equipment, which has recently been 
substituted, greatly increased. It was a reasonably 
predictable result. 
However, once the distortions of the price 
system have been corrected, it can be observed 
that the average protection, not very high, con-
ceals effective protectionist levels, rather high in 
some branches of industry: 52% in machinery, 
82% in electrical equipment, 60% in chemicals, 
85% in pharmaceutical products and 64% in 
perfumes. 
On the product level, cases of much higher 
protection can no doubt be found. The reason for 
this is well-known: the import substitution pro-
cess, especially in the heroic stage of the 1950s 
and during the time of scarce foreign exchange 
in the 1980s, showed little selectivity or flexibil-
ity. This was particularly true of flexibility, in the 
sense that the usual procedure consisted of fixing 
certain indexes of nationalization for the main 
products, which had to be reached rapidly. (Little 
attention was paid to the much more than pro-
portionate increases in costs arising from small 
increments of those indexes, after a certain 
level.) 
Consequently, the correct interpretation of 
the question of the level of tariff protection 
demands great care. The use of averages by sec-
tors (whether according to the criterion of effec-
tive tariff or implicit protection) generally 
underestimates the protectionist character of the 
system, in so far as there are a considerable 
number of branches, and particularly products, 
with negative protection. What is basically of 
interest, then, is to consider on the product level 
what is over and above the average. 
Another distortion mentioned in the study is 
the large dispersion of the levels of protection 
between the different branches. It runs from 
-18% for non-metallic minerals to +97% for 
pharmaceutical products. The final liquid level 
of protection in other branches is not the result 
of a deliberate policy, but often only of the 
accumulation of the effects of multiple instru-
ments with different objectives, in itself, the 
excessive dispersion can indicate a real level of 
protection higher than what is apparent, in so 
far as it implies a large number of branches with 
below average protection, and therefore also a 
large number with above average protection 
(which is, as stated above, the usual case). 
What can be said, then, about Brazilian 
industry? It is, above all, enormously hetero-
geneous in technology and management. 
Because of these and other factors, it is also 
enormously heterogeneous with respect to levels 
of productivity. This fact, moreover, was explic-
itly recognized in the proposed industrial policy 
of the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), 
presented in May 1988. The heterogeneity can 
be seen between branches of industry, within the 
same branch, and at times within the same firm 
(between different plants). The conclusions 
about whether or not this fact has economic 
importance will be presented below, when the 
question of strengthening the competitiveness 
of the country is analysed. Nevertheless, some 
factors responsible for this heterogeneity are 
worth mentioning. 
The first and most obvious factor is that 
import substitution moved from non-durable 
consumer goods in the 1930s to durable consu-
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mer goods in the 1950s, with some substitution 
in other categories. From 1974 to the present, 
import substitution has especially affected inter-
mediate and capital goods. The different ages of 
the diverse industrial establishments are due to 
this substitution. 
Thus, some modern sectors, developed on 
the basis of the 1974 strategy, such as basic 
inputs and capital goods, have new plants, with 
an economical scale and a state-of-the-art elec-
tromechanical technology. There are, however, 
even in this group, branches, such as paper and 
pulp, in which large integrated enterprises coex-
ist with smaller, less modern, enterprises. These 
have their own internal heterogeneity, since 
they maintain machines in old plants (on the 
limits of economic and technical survival). 
In the older sectors, of both durable and 
non-durable consumer goods, there were very 
different degrees of modernization throughout 
the boom of the 1970s, depending largely on the 
extent to which their export drive faced compe-
tition from the rest of the world. 
The situation became complicated with the 
stagnation of recent years and the lack of invest-
ment already mentioned. The base was already 
very differentiated, and became even more so 
because of the disparity of efforts made by the 
different sectors to adopt the logic of informatics 
during the present decade. This disparity was 
caused by the enterprises' own policies, as well 
as, during a certain stage, by the obstacles arising 
from the restriction on imports and the policy on 
informatics. Consequently, evidence is accumu-
lating that in several sectors, including the 
export-oriented industries (like textiles, foot-
wear and automotive vehicles), technological 
backwardness ¡s beginning to have a real effect 
on the competitiveness of the country. 
A recent study of technological innovation in 
the Brazilian processing industry was conducted 
by the Brazilian Institute of Economics (of the 
Getulio Vargas Foundation). Although only pre-
liminary, it gives an idea of the results of this 
evolution. The criterion consisted of having each 
sector evaluate subjectively its degree of moder-
nization. The results vary. The indexes are 98% 
for the aeronautics industry, 95% for steel, 92% 
for chemical elements and products, 90% for 
non-ferrous minerals, 79% for pulp and paper, 
66% for sound and television apparatus, 65% 
for machine-tools, 46% for automotive vehicles, 
37% for tractors and earth-moving equipment 
and 14% for milk and milk products. 
A second factor of heterogeneity is the sys-
tem of industrial protection, the characteristics 
of which have already been mentioned. In the 
most recent stage, direct administrative action 
was the rule, case by case. Then a level of ensured 
protection came into existence, an element of 
protection unsolicited by those to be protected, 
but rather arising simply from the country's 
need to avoid spending foreign exchange. 
According to the analysis of Honorio Kume 
(no date), the Brazilian system of protection was 
characterized by the generalized presence of 
tariffs that exceeded in almost all sectors the 
protection needed, and by the broad use of non-
tariff barriers (list of suspended products, pre-
vious authorizations, minimum terms for 
financing) which recently affected almost 60% 
of the processing industry. There was also the 
Law of the Local Similar Product (often inter-
preted in a simplistic way, only in terms of the 
existence of a similar product in the country, 
without taking into account the other requisites 
of the same law) and the approval of the annual 
budget for the imports of each enterprise. In 
recent years, there has also been the effect of the 
restrictions from the Informatics Law. 
At the same time, additional taxes on 
imports were collected, such as the IOF, the TMP 
(to improve the ports) and the AFRMM (addi-
tional tax for the renovation of the merchant 
marine). 
To sum up, the system could be described as 
irrational, out of touch with the current indus-
trial structure of the country and the objectives 
of the industrial policy, complicated, extremely 
haphazard, redundant in innumerable sectors 
and inadequate in others (which was determined 
by a direct, non-tariff control). Only the compe-
tence of the agencies that had to apply it, mainly 
the external trade agency (CACEX), avoided 
worse problems, even though it was unable to 
overcome all the drawbacks of irrationality and 
haphazardness. The operation of the system vir-
tually meant importing only goods which com-
plemented the country's industrial structure. 
Given the almost prohibitive character of 
the system (in the sense of prohibitive tariffs), 
and its aim of saving foreign exchange, it is no 
surprise that special systems multiplied, at times 
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affecting almost 80% of imports. Recently, 
there were 42 special systems, which awarded 
exemptions and reductions to 70% of foreign 
purchases, without counting crude oil. 
It is also no surprise, given the high and 
irrational level of protection, that many sectors 
ignored demands to keep costs down and 
increase productivity. 
Finally, we should also mention as a factor of 
heterogeneity the preponderant presence in 
After these reflections on the present state of 
Brazilian industry, we should consider what sig-
nals Brazil wants to send, both to itself and to the 
rest of the world, regarding its plans for future 
development. 
It seems to us that these signals consist 
mainly of the following: 
a) The country wants to return to the path of 
modernization. This had its already-known lim-
itations, and even gave rise to a good deal of 
structural heterogeneity between the economic, 
social and political fields. Nevertheless, it 
showed Brazil's desire to develop economically 
according to modern patterns. The country's 
roots, with their known limitations (related to 
exacerbated individualism and the dualism of the 
State, which has one modern face and another 
paternalistic face) do not impede the process of 
industrialization and urbanization, with a grow-
ing autonomy of civil society vis-a-vis the tutel-
age of the State. 
b) The new strategy will be applied from the 
perspective of growth with redistribution and 
reforms. Growth is considered indispensable for 
modernization, including social and political 
modernization, but it is combined with a social 
strategy, capable of leading to the gradual crea-
tion of a mass-consumption market and, the 
gradual reversal of the factors that lead to a 
concentration of income and the rapid reduction 
of absolute poverty. 
c) The new industrial strategy means essen-
tially that Brazil must reaffirm its commitment 
Brazilian industry of a contingent of small and 
medium enterprises, the vast majority of which 
are operated by individuals or families. Accord-
ing to the 1980 census, in the 19 branches of 
industry, microenterprises and small and 
medium enterprises as a group were responsible 
for 56% of value added and 96% of the qumber 
of employees.1 We will have to return to the 
problem of small and medium industry when we 
try to define the strategy. 
to industrialization and enter a new stage of that 
process. Brazil must begin a new phase of 
advanced industrialization, selectively and grad-
ually incorporating high technology with a view 
to generating dynamic comparative advantages. 
This new phase is also characterized by the gen-
eral development of Brazil's industrial competi-
tiveness so that it can supply the domestic 
market more efficiently and expand exports. 
d) Brazil's crisis is mostly of internal origin. 
It stems from the country's political and eco-
nomic situation (although it also has an external 
cause linked to the public sector's limited capac-
ity to invest). For this reason, the solutions 
should be sought essentially on the domestic 
front. Brazil should try to create a national con-
sensus aimed at defining a development model; 
at paying attention to the more obvious political 
conditions of growth; and at considering in an 
interrelated way the serious short-term crisis (to 
avoid hyperinflation and gradually reduce infla-
tion), the medium-term perspectives and the 
major national questions, Only such an inte-
grated vision will make .it possible to return to 
sustained growth. This does not prevent, but 
rather implies, that external economic problems 
'The Institute of Developing Economies in Japan pointed 
out: in 1983, nearly two million Brazilian enterprises declared that 
they had no employee (67% of the total of all establishments). The 
study suggests an idea of the size of the informal market, estimat-
ing that such enterprises have around six million employees; i.e., 
something less than 20% of the total number of employees in the 
urban zone. 
Ill 
The basic ideas of the new strategy 
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should be faced at the same time, especially the 
problem of the debt and the linkage with the 
world economy. 
e) The country is attentive to the new 
industrialization trends in the world and to the 
new realities of the increasingly global nature of 
the international economy and expansion of 
common markets on several continents. In view 
of this new world movement, it tries to become 
involved more efficiently and more rationally, 
directed by an affirmation of its interests, but 
within the modern, not isolationist, vision, 
perceiving the opportunities and the risks of this 
involvement. 
Some of the implications of the new strategy 
are worth examining more closely. 
First, the sources of dynamism. Brazil 
already learned how, mostly in the 1970s, to 
develop a growth dynamic centred on 
investments to meet the expansion of the 
domestic market (which corresponded to close 
to 85% or 90% of industrial growth up to the 
end of the 1970s), but which at the same time 
invested to substitute for imports and increase 
exports. Preferably, both goals were sought 
simultaneously, as happened in the case of basic 
inputs and capitai goods. 
Attempts are now being made to recover 
this dynamism, adapting it to the new circum-
stances. Naturally, the role of import substitu-
tion in the traditional sense, which implied large 
blocs of new sectors, is more limited, since the 
country just finished a long cycle of substitutions 
(the 1974 strategy). However, since Brazil 
is not in the vanguard of industrialization or 
technological progress, import substitution is 
always needed. It is a permanent process, 
although with different phases, depending on 
how far behind the country has fallen. It is evi-
dent, then, that once the basic-input sectors are 
installed —petrochemicals, steel, paper and 
pulp, non-ferrous minerals, fertilizers— pro-
gress can be made in the domestic production of 
more elaborated products in these areas (third 
and fourth generation products) and their rami-
fications in several directions. The same can be 
said, selectively, about some new kinds of equip-
ment, mainly related to informatics. 
However, the most important point is that 
import substitution will be linked with the new 
phenomenon of world-wide industrialization: 
high technologies, like informatics and electron-
ics, biotechnology and the new materials. For 
example, import substitution and the incorpora-
tion of new technologies are interrelated, since 
they bring to the country production of new 
electronic controls for capital goods and for local 
electronic products, or of digital components for 
electronic data-processing equipment, commun-
ications, laser, etc. Specious discussions aside, we 
will consider both import substitution and the 
incorporation of new technologies in general, 
recognizing the importance of the role which 
they have to play in the strategy. Let us consider 
why. 
It is no doubt important to incorporate the 
new technologies, selectively and with a definite 
strategy for each one. First, because in 
themselves they offer a dynamism which will 
contribute to growth. It is a question of the well-
known process of Schumpeter's analysis, in 
which innovations and new products give rise to 
new investment cycles, whether large or small. 
Moreover, by simply observing the tremend-
ous technological and managerial heterogeneity 
in the Brazilian industrial complex, as well as the 
diversity of factors upon which the competitive-
ness of the country in the three main categories 
of export manufactures depends, we can see that 
these new technologies assume another very 
important function during the present stage: to 
make possible the technological updating or 
modernization of a great number of industrial 
branches. The process should certainly be care-
fully conducted, attending to the situation of 
each sector, with criteria of macroeconomic logic 
that take into account overall employment in the 
economy; it is not a question of modernizing 
simply to modernize. 
This brings us to the problem of industrial 
competitiveness. We repeat industrial in order 
to emphasize the important concept of competi-
tiveness, analysed in the well-known study of 
Fernando Fajnzylber (1988). It is impossible to 
try to base the competitive capacity of exports on 
large real devaluations of the exchange rate and 
on stable wages, except in emergency situations. 
This procedure destroys the social structure of a 
country in the long run. 
The exchange rate must certainly be realistic 
(the exchange can even be a little above parity 
with purchasing power, without considering the 
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effect of external inflation) and real wages 
should be governed by productivity increases. 
However, competitiveness has its own essential 
dimension, related to industrial productivity. In 
that dimension, competitiveness is partially con-
nected with technological advancement and can 
include the new technologies, but it is also con-
nected with all the other factors that condition 
operating costs and investment, including the 
correction of the distortions in the current indus-
trial structure. At the same time, the question of 
employment and the well-being of the popula-
tion must be taken into account. Competitive-
ness cannot be economically and socially 
destructive as a result of a recession or lower real 
wages. 
After all, why do we need more 
competitiveness? 
Basically because we want an economy with 
rising real wages, without detriment to highly 
dynamic employment; and in order to avoid 
inflationary pressures, this has to be obtained 
through productivity increases. Also, it seems to 
be the time to begin to consider the perspective 
of the domestic consumer, since the economy is 
integrated and diversified, and its initial stages 
of industrialization, in spite of its emergent 
character, are apparently over. The domestic 
consumer, as far as possible, must obtain good 
quality and a good price. And finally, because we 
want to base the conquest of external markets on 
concrete economic factors, like those referred to, 
and not on the artificial use of the ratio between 
the exchange rate and wages. 
Competitiveness, then, has a domestic objec-
tive —to serve the consumer— and an external 
objective —to improve exports. In both cases, it 
should provide ever larger real wages and be 
consistent with the growth of overall 
employment. 
Another aspect that deserves comment is 
the following: the strategy was already defined 
in accordance with a dynamic based on the 
expansion of the domestic market designed to 
attain simultaneously import substitution and 
the incorporation of new sectors, as well as an 
increase of exports. In this process, it could be to 
the country's advantage to have a progressive 
rise during a determined period of time in the 
coefficients of exports and imports, in so far as 
the former have been low (except in an atypical 
year like 1988), and the latter even lower (5%). 
The idea would be to increase exports and 
imports to rates somewhat above those of the 
gross domestic product (with a higher differen-
tial in the case of imports) but to maintain at the 
same time a commercial trade balance of the 
order of US$12 billion, or somewhat more, to 
pay between 50% and 60% of the interest on the 
debt. 
Emphasis should be given to the importance 
of first defining the objectives, in order to give 
meaning, for example, to the discussion of mat-
ters such as the trade surplus and the export and 
import coefficients. It is a question of making a 
new development strategy viable, from a pers-
pective of growth with redistribution and 
reforms. The surplus and both coefficients are 
instruments of this strategy, and should be consi-
dered as such in order to judge whether or not 
the proposed definitions should be maintained. 
The element which makes it possible to evaluate 
them is, above all, their functionality within this 
strategy. 
For example: why increase imports? Essen-
tially in order to grow more, to modernize cer-
tain industrial sectors and to increase the 
competitiveness of exports. Far from hurting 
domestic industry, the goal is to make it more 
solid, since it will be more efficient when it is up 
to date. In other words, more production goods 
should be selectively imported, and not more 
consumer goods (except marginally). There 
would emerge an industrial structure located on 
a higher level of competitiveness; i.e., a higher 
level of resistance to the incursions from the 
exterior and a greater dynamism in the search 
for external markets. 
And why increase exports? Also in order to 
grow, through a greater use of domestic factors 
of production (manpower, natural resources, 
intermediate products, machines); and, in the 
following stage, to increase the domestic market, 
to the extent that these additional factors lead to 
the purchase of more goods and services within 
the country. At the same time, exports serve two 
other ends: they finance the larger amount of 
imports desired, without increasing the external 
debt; and they pay the interest on the external 
debt, as was already said. Edmar Bacha once 
pointed out, correctly, that it made no sense to 
think that Brazil could become an export plat-
form. However, it does make sense to raise the 
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coefficient of exports during the next few years, 
in the gradual way that has been proposed. 
Having already dealt with the aspects of the 
strategy that are related to the external sector 
(exports and imports), we now examine more 
closely its incorporation into the international 
economy. 
Keesing (1967) stated very accurately the 
idea of an "outward-looking" strategy. For him, 
After having examined the trends in industriali-
zation throughout the world and the trends in 
competition on a global scale, we are better 
equipped to analyse the implications of the 
industrial and technological strategy suggested. 
As pointed out, this strategy, within a selec-
tive and flexible focus which differentiates ¡t 
from the policies adopted in the initial phases of 
our industrialization, comprises two major lines 
of action: 
a) To explore the new dynamic comparative 
advantages of the country, which are still not 
completely known, acquired through technologi-
cal advances already under way: electronics, 
informatics, the linkage of these with mechanics, 
advanced industrial chemicals, the use of new 
materials and biotechnology. This technological 
and industrial development is urgent, especially 
because of the lack of initiative in the last few 
years and the backwardness of certain more 
modern sectors of Brazilian industry. 
b) To fortify national competitiveness, 
domestic and external, by developing technology 
and management where it is justified from a 
macroeconomic viewpoint, and by correcting the 
distortions linked to excessively widespread 
import substitution or to a comfortable domestic 
climate, the result of an excessive or irrational 
protection. In the overall effort to increase com-
petitiveness, the social consequences of the stra-
tegy will certainly always have to be taken into 
account, especially those related to employment. 
"outward-looking" means essentially a strategy 
that gives constant and deliberate attention to 
trends in commerce and industrialization 
beyond the borders of the country itself, as does 
Japan and the supercompetitors of Asia. This 
constant study of what is happening in the world 
puts them in a position to take advantage of 
future opportunities and to anticipate eventual 
risks. 
A third line of action can be added to these 
two basic lines, in the following terms: 
c) To complete the effort to carry the logic of 
industrialization and modernization to the sec-
tors which form a necessary part of a diversified 
and integrated economy, such as agriculture, 
functional services (industrial services of public 
utility, transportation, communications, storage, 
modern commerce, finances) and mining. 
Unlike what happens in economies like 
those of Japan and Korea that lack natural 
resources, the exploitation of Brazil's compara-
tive advantages can never lose sight of the tre-
mendous opportunities available in sectors such 
as agriculture and mining. 
If we consider the development of the first 
line of action, we should ask what are the conse-
quences of the new world-wide technological 
pattern for the comparative advantages of the 
country. This new pattern raises two major ques-
tions. The first concerns changes in the very 
concept of the factory, in manufacturing pro-
cesses and in the organization of production. 
The other has to do with the effects of the new 
materials and new productive methods on the 
use of traditional raw materials (given that these 
new methods and materials save on inputs), and 
with the consequences of biotechnology on agri-
cultural productivity. 
With respect to the first question, it must be 
remembered that the traditional technological 
pattern —which goes back to the beginning of 
IV 
The strategy: perception of the new comparative 
advantages and the ways to obtain them 
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the century and the revolution initiated by 
Henry Ford in the automobile industry when he 
set up assembly lines— was designed to produce 
a standardized product on a large scale (mass 
production methods). Up till a short time ago, 
automation did not affect that logic, and only 
meant a greater use of machinery and reduced 
use of labour, a factor which was scarce in the 
industrial economies. 
The new technological pattern, whose char-
acteristics are flexibilityW and integration, is 
capable of being applied in a general way to all 
industrial activities, and not only to mass pro-
duction, like automation in the previous pattern. 
According to a special study of the Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) of the United 
Nations (1986), there are two new important 
advances: 
i) In mass production processes, the control 
of the machines with computers makes it possi-
ble to increase the flexibility of the productive 
system, in so far as it can be used to manufacture 
innumerable variants of the product, with min-
imum transition times. At the same time, the 
need to maintain stocks is considerably reduced, 
and it is easier to adapt to market preferences. 
Even the automotive industry (birthplace of the 
concepts of the assembly line and automation) is 
moving away from mass, standardized produc-
tion, and moving towards the production of dif-
ferentiated lots in large volumes. 
ii) Nevertheless, the technology of control-
ling manufacturing with computers has even 
greater potential in traditional activities of pro-
duction in small and medium-sized lots (a very 
important development, considering that even 
in the United States 75% of manufactured arti-
cles are produced in lots of between 50 and 100 
units). 
While the previous model of automation is 
essentially oriented towards diminishing the 
cost of labour per unit produced, the new techno-
logical pattern is aimed at a better use of all the 
items that enter into the total cost (even time); 
at reducing stocks of products, either in process 
or finished; at completely integrating the stages; 
and at obtaining superior quality and more gua-
ranteed products. 
The second type of advance can be of particu-
lar interest for developing countries, in so far as 
it means improving productivity without neces-
sarily using automation. It is a question of 
obtaining continuous productivity increases, 
through successive improvements in the organi-
zation of production (new technologies of social 
organization of production —TSOP—, as 
opposed to technologies of flexible automation 
—TFA—, in the terminology of Tauile). This 
eliminates losses of time and materials, and high 
quality products are obtained, with no defects. 
These improvements can accompany or not 
a greater automation. The use of the new tech-
nologies of social organization of production 
change the productivity of automated systems 
(which before was almost a datum, once the 
learning stage was over) or of those that use few 
machines. For example, a recent study of Japan's 
Institute of Developing Economies recommends 
the use of techniques of this kind in Brazil's 
small and medium-sized industry: total quality 
control, "kanban" or just in time, zero waste,etc. 
Added to these are design and manufacturing 
methods that computers use (computer-aided 
design —CAD— and computer-aided manufac-
turing —CAM). We thus have different forms of 
software, to give them a name, which do not 
imply automation, and which, according to Hen-
rique Rattner (1988), are already being used 
successfully in small and medium- sized industry 
in places like France, Italy, the Netherlands and 
the Federal Republic of Germany, through pro-
grammes that count on government support. 
With respect to the second type of question 
raised by the new world-wide pattern of technol-
ogy, much has been said —including the well-
known article of Peter Drucker in Foreign 
Affairs (1986)— about the trend towards less 
demand for traditional raw materials (steel pro-
ducts, copper, aluminium). This is because the 
new methods of production need less materials 
per unit of product, and also because the incorpo-
ration of new materials (ceramics and plastics 
for the automobile industry, semiconductors for 
the microelectronic and informatics industries, 
optic fibres for the photoelectronic industry, 
superconductors for the transmission and stor-
age of energy, etc.). 
Having analysed all the practical consequen-
ces, we may observe that the principal effect in 
the medium term could be the use of new mate-
rials, especially for new uses, and not so much 
the substitution of old materials. The effect of 
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substitution is certainly irreversible; but perhaps 
its repercussions will not be dramatic in five to 
10 years (except in Japan). This is not to deny the 
importance of the problem, but only to say that 
we shall need time to prepare for it. 
With respect to biotechnology, and without 
trying to underestimate the change that it will 
produce in the conditions of agricultural produc-
tivity when advantages from the climate and 
abundance of land are reduced, its effects tend to 
be rather gradual. Nevertheless, it is certainly 
necessary to be alert. 
There is one basic idea that should be 
stressed: according to the new technological 
pattern, the intensive use of technology in a 
great number of industrial sectors will mean in 
practice that many of the comparative advan-
tages will be created by the basic aptitudes the 
country manages to develop. Relative endow-
ments of natural factors (work, land, natural raw 
materials) will become less and less important. 
However, it is evident that the best results will 
be obtained by taking advantage —using the new 
technologies— of the factors that are abundant 
in the country, whether semi-skilled manpower 
or natural resources, or more highly specialized 
manpower (less abundant, but, even so, much 
less expensive than in the developed countries). 
This last factor, for example, can create competi-
tiveness even in technologically very advanced 
sectors, such as international engineering servi-
ces and computer programming (software). 
In short, we have to use our radar to obtain 
new comparative advantages, within the speci-
ficity of the conditions the country offers. 
Having examined the implications of the 
new technological pattern, we can have some 
idea of the possible new areas of Brazilian com-
petitiveness. In doing so, we must strive to be 
specific. As an initial approximation and taking 
as a reference the classification of Brazil's factors 
of competitiveness presented in the IEI study 
(Federal University of Rio de Janeiro), we can 
point to the following trends in Brazil's dynamic 
comparative advantages: 
a) The establishment of a new group of sec-
tors, related to the generation of a minimum of 
critical mass in the high technologies, through 
selected production lines and specific strategies 
for each new technology: informatics (physical 
components and logical components), electron-
ics, and the linkage of both of these with 
mechanics to form a mechanoelectronic indus-
try; new materials and biotechnology. 
With respect to new materials, their highest 
development is expected in Japan, where, by the 
year 2000, 40% of the manufacture of automo-
tive vehicles will employ new materials. Brazil 
could have some opportunities (new metallic 
alloys, ceramics, quartz, since 90% of the world 
reserves are found in the country). With respect 
to biotechnology, the more simple techniques 
are relatively easy to dominate. 
High technology, particularly informatics 
and electronics, generally includes short-cycle 
products (subject to rapid obsolescence), and 
these brief cycles tend progressively to become 
even shorter. 
For this reason, Brazil could possibly 
develop along those lines, with a policy that 
includes a rapid absorption of technology and a 
certain technological capacity of its own, but in 
association (with the large world producers, 
through the purchase of technology and the 
establishment of corporations), and only excep-
tionally in the vanguard. Likewise, as suggested 
below, Brazil will have to create a special and 
efficient system of incentives. 
The computer industry, with a reasonable 
structure already in place, will have to move on 
to a stage in which it will become more competi-
tive and more solid technologically, economi-
cally and financially. Its costs are still very high, 
especially because of the excessive number of 
enterprises, which prevents the industry from 
taking advantage of economies of scale. An 
effort should be made, then, to restructure the 
industry in such a way as to augment the scale of 
a certain number of adequately capitalized enter-
prises; to induce them to make a greater effort to 
adapt and improve (by reducing technological 
passivity); and perhaps also to seek some 
markets abroad. 
In general, the new technology sectors could 
be expanded with a view to looking for good 
opportunities to incorporate themselves into 
external markets. Such opportunities certainly 
exist for computer programmes {software), 
owing to the critical mass already in place and to 
the greater competitiveness that it has shown. 
Moreover, this can be accomplished with a small 
investment. Some of our own vanguard technol-
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ogies —such as the exploitation of petroleum in 
deep water and the transmission of electric 
energy in continuous current over long 
distances— can also be adapted for a develop-
ment of this kind. 
It is useful to recall that this first group of 
activities will play an important role in the 
modernization of almost all the other groups, 
through a case-by-case analysis which will con-
sider the aspect of the economic feasibility of the 
change and the desirability of adopting it, 
according to macroeconomic criteria, for exam-
ple, employment. 
Given current synergies, Brazil's develop-
ment should be conducted through an integrated 
policy for informatics, telecommunications and 
consumer electronics, which is important even 
for the feasibility of the production of microelec-
tronic components in the country. 
b) Development of a line of strategic invest-
ments, with a high priority for the group of 
sectors whose technology could be mastered arid 
whose products have a long, cycle. These are 
mainly capital goods, high-quality steel, compo-
nents for durable consumer goods and capital 
goods, and the aeronautical industry (which is 
approximately equivalent to Group III in the IEI 
study of the Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro). Naval construction could also be 
included in this group. The automotive vehicle 
industry is a special case. In order to reach more 
demanding markets, it will have to develop new 
models (by introducing automation in the pro-
ductive process, as well as by using electronic 
components and new materials). 
Since they are long-cycle products, whose 
technology is advanced but does not change very 
rapidly, Brazil could choose the appropriate sec-
tors and use them to become a world-level leader 
(in the case of the aeronautical industry, only in a 
certain line of small planes; in the others, with-
out that kind of limitation). 
Brazil is already exporting high-quality steel 
products to some 50 countries, and dominates 
the technology; it can ensure, then, its place in 
the world-level vanguard. The international 
trend consists in a small number of leading firms 
coming together, while the other producers 
begin to function as associates. 
Brazil's competitiveness can also extend to 
different kinds of special metal alloys, where it 
has advantages because of its natural resources. 
The situation of capital goods is more com-
plex. Nevertheless, it makes sense that the coun-
try try to obtain a place in the international 
vanguard. This sector also tends to be concen-
trated in a small number of countries and pro-
ducers. The reason is that the developed nations, 
with a few exceptions, are losing their competi-
tiveness because of the high cost of specialized 
labour (which the sector uses intensively) or 
because of the rising revaluation of the European 
and Japanese currencies in relation to the dollar. 
The adjustment process of the capital goods sec-
tor is especially felt in the United States, but is 
also growing in Japan. The Republic of Korea 
and the People's Republic of China are emerging 
as large producers (the Soviet Union's technol-
ogy is out of date). 
Brazil has a great opportunity, because it can 
employ specialized labour at reduced costs, 
which ensures products of recognized quality in 
competitive conditions. However, in order to 
exploit this advantage, two conditions must be 
met: Brazil must ensure access to and dominate 
the technology, and count on considerable sup-
port from the domestic market. This second 
condition is difficult at the present time, since 
orders from the State are paralysed and the pri-
vate sector is hesitant to invest. 
Consequently, in order to reaffirm the inter-
national competitiveness of the country and 
aspire to a growing participation in the van-
guard, the sector must apply a programme that is 
consistent in: 
Technological modernization. The machine-
tool segment needs to be modernized through a 
greater use of numerically controlled machine 
tools (NCMT) and machining centres. There is 
an even greater need for modernization in the 
made-on-demand capital goods sector, which 
entails numerically controlled machine-tools, 
machining centres and computer-aided design 
systems in project activities. 
The security of being able to dominate the 
technology. This is only possible with a prosper-
ous domestic market, which confers a better 
position for negotiating with suppliers of tech-
nology during the stage in which the national 
enterprise develops its capacity to absorb, adapt 
and then generate that knowledge. Also, such 
domination is only obtained on the basis of an 
incentive system for the firms in the technologi-
cal sphere. 
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The gradual introduction of new kinds of 
equipment, incorporating the new technological 
pattern (informatics) to the extent allowed by 
domestic demand and export alternatives. 
The application of a broad programme to 
gain external markets, which will only acquire 
the necessary dimension if it is associated with 
the effort to modernize and dominate the 
technology. 
Consolidation of the country's capacity for 
competition in the basic-input group (Group Ii 
in the IEI study of the Federal University of Rio 
de Janeiro). The priorities are the following: 
i) p a p e r and p u l p , whose i ndus t r i a l 
establishment is modern, but out of date with 
respect to the application of informatics for the 
automatic control of processes; ii) steel, which 
also has a new situation with respect to 
technology, especially in heavy flat and rolled 
steel, but needs some investments to modernize 
and link up with the capital goods industry in 
order to develop the country's basic 
technological project, and hi) chemicals and 
petrochemicals, whose processing installations 
should modernize through automation and the 
application of informatics to process controls. In 
this latter sector, more complex segments of 
p e t r o c h e m i c a l s (p las t i cs of advanced 
engineering et ai), and more elaborated 
chemicals should be incorporated. 
The revitalization of more traditional 
spheres of industrial activity, such as textiles, 
footwear, pharmaceutical products, certain food 
products (especially milk and meat products) 
and the whole range of construction materials. 
These correspond to Group I of the above-
mentioned IEI study. 
The conservation of the competitive 
capacity of agroindústria! complexes, like soya 
and orange juice. It would be expedient to review 
the situation of the agroindustries of sugar, 
alcohol, now very dependent on subsidies. 
With respect to the development of Groups I 
and II, two questions should be considered which 
are certainly of interest for the future of industry 
in the country. The development of the North-
east and Amazonia (with a selective character 
for the latter) should be priorities for the 
national strategy. However, the policy applied in 
both regions should not be allowed to create 
insuperable distortions. 
The first point refers to a re-examination of 
the Foreign Trade Zone of Manaus. This should 
be maintained as, moreover, is provided for by 
the Constitution. However, the original project 
must not be distorted. It was conceived as a 
mechanism to provide the area of influence of 
Manaus with the dynamic effects of a pole of 
integrated growth, both industrial and 
agricultural. That means, in this case, ensuring 
that the integrated character be maintained, 
even with respect to feeding the population of 
the zone with the agricultural production. Given 
the high level of current subsidies, the Foreign 
Trade Zone should also be prevented from 
assuming dimensions that are disproportionate 
with its purpose. 
An observation can be made regarding this 
last point. The incorporation of high technolo-
gies benefits a great deal from the interconnec-
tion between informatics and electronics 
(physical components, peripheral elements and 
logical components) and consumer electronics. 
It is reasonable to keep part of consumer elec-
tronics in the Foreign Trade Zone; but the future 
of the country's consumer electronics cannot be 
centralized there, and even less so the future of 
the new technology industries. The whole 
modernization of Brazilian industry and the 
exploitation of the new comparative advantages 
depend on these industries. For this reason, such 
sectors have to be developed essentially at com-
petitive costs, wherever their location is the 
most efficient. 
A second issue which needs to be re-
examined is the decision regarding the pro-
gramme of export processing zones. 
The industrial development of the North-
east should be pursued through: integrated 
industrial complexes, especially those that use 
the region's natural resources, like the petro-
chemical pole of Bahía, the chemical complex of 
Alagoas and the alcohol plant in Pernambuco; 
the agroindus trial projects in which the region 
has competitive conditions, such as vegetable 
oils, fruit juices, tinned fruits, etc.; the export 
projects of manufactured products or their pro-
duction for the regional market, made feasible by 
regional fiscal incentives; the exclusivity of the 
special import arrangement (or tax reduction or 
exemption) in certain sectors such as textiles; 
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the preference in locating projects of State enter-
prises, without detriment to their economic and 
financial feasibility. 
With a creative approach, a whole system of 
differentiation can be used to favour the North-
east in the framework of credit and fiscal policies 
of the Union, particularly when it is a question of 
ensuring the capacity to export. 
However, it is not expedient to use mecha-
nisms like those of the export processing zones, 
which Brazil stopped applying at the beginning 
of the 1970s, a time when they may have been 
more justifiable. These zones, which are real 
enclaves, were created by the so-called "tigers" of 
Asia when they were beginning to industrialize, 
as a means of offering attractive minimums to 
foreign capital, which knew practically nothing 
of those countries. Brazil at that time already was 
receiving a large flow of direct foreign invest-
ment, and did not need such a measure. On the 
contrary, instruments were used such as the con-
cession of fiscal benefits to special export pro-
grammes (BEFIEX), which are integrated into 
the industrial structure of the country as tempor-
ary mechanisms for promoting determined 
export lines. 
Having presented the idea of the new 
national comparative advantages, mention 
should be made of some conditions for these to 
become effective in practice. These are mainly 
linked to two kinds of relations which need to be 
created in a society oriented towards a 
progressive affirmation of the new technological 
pattern: a relation of co-operation and not 
antagonism between the governmental and 
private sectors; and also a relation of co-
operation and not conflict in the system of 
labour relations (mainly between engineering 
teams and specialized workers on the one hand, 
and the management of enterprises on the 
other). 
Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI) (1988),Competividade 
industrial: uma estratégia para o Brasil (leaflet), May. 
Drucker, Peter (1986), "The changed world economy", Foreign 
Affairs, vol- 64, No. 4, New York, Council of Forcing Rela-
tions, Inc., Spring. 
Economic Commission for Europe (1986), Recent Trends in 
The first point was emphasized recently in 
the United States in an important book of Simon 
Ramo (1988), one of the two geniuses that hold 
up Hughues Aircraft, and now the president of 
TRW, Inc., the giant of the aerospace sector. 
According to Ramo, one of the factors 
responsible for his country's loss of 
competitiveness with respect to Japan consists 
in the fact that Washington and Wall Street 
(that is, the government and the capital market) 
have not given enough importance to the role of 
science and technology, and have allowed the 
public sector and the enterprises to relate to one 
another as adversaries. In his judgement, the 
concept of federal government action being 
limited only to regulate economic activity is 
clearly out of date; it should be replaced by 
another, one of close co-operation and mutual 
support, without confusing interests. 
For the second point, it has become evident 
that one of the secrets of the success of the 
Japanese enterprise management teams consists 
of the relationship of co-operation between the 
personne l of the en te rpr i ses and its 
administration, with a view to constant 
improvement of productivity and quality. The 
price for this is that the different categories of 
employees share in the better results obtained 
because of productivity increases. 
These are the rules of the new technological 
pattern, which is characterized by the 
predominance of research, technology and the 
better organization of industrial production; by 
the constant modification of the factors of 
competitiveness; and by the trend to a 
competitiveness of global reach, which not only 
includes the activities of the enterprise, but also 
important aspects of the type of society in which 
that enterprise is situated. Those who fail to 
perceive this reality will not meet the challenges 
of our times. 
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